>>23329698
>Being is difference itself

The Aoristos Dyas (Finite & Infinite) is not the Apeiron, the Apeiron is not the Monad/Absolute. The holos of the particular is predicated upon the Absolute-- is an Emmanation therefrom, but that is one way. The Apodictic Ground of All is of little account compared to apodicity in play (which is for us).

>>23329764
I want to engage with you rigorously. So first, let me translate your post into consistent Platonic terms. I hope this doesn't sound pedantic or condescending. I genuinely don't want to get confused here.
>The Aoristos Dyas (Peras & Apeiron) is not the Apeiron, the Apeiron is not the Monad/???[Absolute]. The holos of the (meros?) is predicated upon the ???[Absolute]—restated, [the holos of the (meros?)] is an ???[emanation] therefrom [the Absolute], but that is one way. The Necessary ???[Ground] of To Pan is of little account compared to necessity in play (which is for us).
I'm assuming that you're importing a Neoplatonic concept (Emanation), a Hegelian concept (Absolute), and maybe a Heideggerian concept (ground as in ground of Being, albeit many German philosophers spoke of grund from Kant onwards) to help do some heavy-lifting, although I'm uncertain as to what their correlates in Plato's thinking would be. I am also uncertain as to what Plato would have called a particular. Would it be a being? A part? Not sure. We should get that squared away.

Currently, as it stands in consistent plain academic English, your posts reads as the following:
>The Indefinite Dyad (Limit and Unlimited) is not the Unlimited, the Unlimited is not the One. The whole of the particular is predicated upon the ... —restated, whole of the particular is an ... therefrom ..., but that is one way. The Necessary Ground of The All is of little account compared to necessary in play (which is for us).

Is that a fair start? I think the things I need clarification on are:
1) What is a particular, especially in Platonic terms?
2) What is the Absolute, especially in Platonic terms?
3) What is an emanation, especially in Platonic terms?
4) What is a ground, especially in Platonic terms?
5) Why is there such a gulf between the necessity of Being and the necessity that lies in our lives as Dasein? Shouldn't they be the one and the same, like the latter is a "zoomed in" aspect of the former, a cutout of what is relevant to us as a part of the whole?

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he was just another atheist annihilationist

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Retard here. Couldn't you define being (all there is, etc) as something like limit, definition, delineation, difference? An absolutely unified One with no limits or differences or divisions whatsoever is unintelligible and impossible to distinguish from nothing at all, both on a "micro" level (as in phenomenology) and a "macro" level (as in ontology). For things to be said to be, they have to be separated or limited from other things, or if you will, they have to negate. Even if your model begins and terminates in an absolutely ineffable monad/one/brahman/whatever, you have to admit of negation somewhere in order to arrive at an explanation for phenomena.

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>>23332414
No worries anon. On philosophy, we're all retarded. But it seems like you're asking the right questions.
>Couldn't you define being (all there is, etc) as something like limit, definition, delineation, difference?
What would this entail? There's two ways of going about this. At first, I thought you were trying to define Being as a genus. And Being cannot be a genus because there is no "supergenus" above Being. You would be defining Being as separate from Nothing, while also defining Nothing as a genus, which creates a contradiction as Nothing cannot be a genus as that would make it a thing. Furthermore, that supergenus, which I'll call "Superbeing", would be an agglomerate of Being and Nothing at the same time, which is a paradox.

However, then you spoke about delineation and difference, and I agree that these entail multiplicity beyond One. The problem is, when we start discussing first philosophy and the nature of being qua being, we run into the problem in that being can be spoken of many things, and many things participate in being. Yet each being is its own being in its own way, and being is no one thing or even is a thing. But despite this multiplicity, being has to be whole in and united in at least one capacity: everything partakes in it. Also, everything that is a thing partakes in some kind of unity as well (the whole is greater than the sum of its parts).

There is a very strange conundrum at the very top of the Porphyrian tree where Substance begins to fall apart, and what is left is Unity, Difference, Nothing, and whatever we can say about Being are all duking it out as a foundation for what allows being to both be One, Many, and every intermediate in-between. That's the best way I can describe it in a nutshell.

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>>23332677
>>23332414
>>23329818
>>23329764
>>23329698
I don't read philosophy but I'll give you bump so that your thread stays up long enough for you to have a conversation with someone.

Stemchads win again, this is pure sophistry.

>>23332414
This is exactly what hegel's Science of Logic is about --- being is nothingless which eventually becomes limit, etc...

>>23333999
>nothing
Not a thing. Does not exist. Cannot be a part of any metaphysical system.

>>23334608
That is exactly the point. If you talk about an absolutely limitless, ineffable Being, you are talking about an unintelligible nothing, and any language you use to describe it (even apophatically) will draw you away from the thing you are attempting to speak of. It is only through limit, definition, and delineation that intelligibility begins. It's like trying to talk about the shape of a particular black cat on a pitch-black night where nothing is even visible.

>>23334753
>If you talk about an absolutely limitless, ineffable Being, you are talking about an unintelligible nothing
This is debatable. Because even if being qua being is apparently indefinite and not able to be captured as a genus, it is still participated in by every definite thing in their own unique ways. This would be in direct contrast with nothing qua nothing, which is so unfathomably lacking in being that it cannot be thought of, it cannot be pointed out, and it literally cannot be, let alone be participated in. Conflating being with nothing, even if being qua being is "undifferentiated" like nothing qua nothing, is perhaps one of the gravest mistakes that one can make in first philosophy.

To bring in an analogy from Greek philosophy, consider the One and compare it with prime matter. Prime matter has no form to differentiate it, thus it is tantamount to nothing (in some way). On the flip side, the One is super-saturated with form while being defined by unity that it cannot be differentiated either. Do not confuse a lack of differentiation for a lack of being.

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bumperino

>>23335622
>it is still participated in by every definite thing in their own unique ways
But if you speak about it without speaking of anything which participates it, in an attempt to speak of being itself, you essentially speak of nothing.
Don't get me wrong. What I mean by nothing is not the unspeakable nothing which cannot even be thought of. I mean an indeterminacy, or an unintelligibility, something like Hegel's example of a dark night on which all cats are black due to the sheer indifferentiation of it all.

>>23338200
>But if you speak about it without speaking of anything which participates it, in an attempt to speak of being itself, you essentially speak of nothing
No, you speak of something which also happens to be undifferentiated. Indeterminacy is not the same as nothing. You're not speaking of nothing, and to conflate the two is to make a grave category error. Refer to my analogy in my last post here: >>23335622 (You)
>To bring in an analogy from Greek philosophy, consider the One and compare it with prime matter. Prime matter has no form to differentiate it, thus it is tantamount to nothing (in some way). On the flip side, the One is super-saturated with form while being defined by unity that it cannot be differentiated either. Do not confuse a lack of differentiation for a lack of being.
If we're talking about nothing qua nothing, we're talking about a nothingness that is so radically vacuous that it isn't even Being qua Being, as that would be something (even if it is undifferentiated). Are you getting what I'm saying? Are you scooping what I'm pooping here? I get the sense that you have somewhat grasped it in your post, but you're not fully accepting the seriousness of its implications, which I'll talk about now.
>What I mean by nothing is not the unspeakable nothing which cannot even be thought of. I mean an indeterminacy, or an unintelligibility, something like Hegel's example of a dark night on which all cats are black due to the sheer indifferentiation of it all.
The problem is that that's not nothing then. That's a something. We're being equivocal here in a way that I think is not helpful and results in a system that is incomplete. It's a bait and switch game, like a motte and bailey argument where being is treated as nothing in a grandiose way (the bailey), only to be forced to a retreat to a much less glamorous position that it's not really "nothing" and rather just indeterminacy when put under scrutiny (the motte). You can't do that. It's not essentially nothing (and I know that's just idiomatic phrasing but it's worth focusing on the essence part since it's metaphysics we are speaking of). It's literally a something by essence.

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let there be metaphysics

>>23338581
I'll answer later today, at work right now.

>>23338581
So let's clear some things up here.
I'm not trying to play language games by using the term "nothing" to mean both something that is impossible to define, differentiate, something indeterminate, etc; the way I see it is that if we mean to speak of being meaningfully, then we are forced to speak of it using terms that define, differentiate, limit, and determine, or else we end up speaking of something so unfocused that we might as well attempt to speak of a true nothing which is unintelligible to the point of being impossible to conceive of. It's partly a reaction to Parmenides-posters I've seen on this site who get all up in arms if you speak of being in anything but the most general terms; admitting change, even in the realm of phenomena, seems tantamount to sacrilege to these people, but I think they've lost sight of something important by envisioning being as a sheer Thing so general that everything else participates in it, even (some definitions of) nothing.
The way I see it, if we try to pare away anything that does not refer to being itself when we speak of it, what are we left with? We cannot say "being is this" or "being is that" as to do so implies a limit, that being is *this* and not *this other.* We cannot say "being is" either, as we thereby imply that being acts by being, or that it is conceivable that being is not, or was not at some point, or could not be. We also imply that we must define being through something else, something it does, even if that other something is simply the act of being. And at that point we're left with the word "being," and now that we're here, isn't the being that can be spoken of, that is, grasped in some way by the fragile and limited human intellect, not the true Being but a shadow of it? Might there not be a being-er Being which we cannot see with our frail eyes? And if we mean to keep this inquiry rational we must either come up with a system which is independent of the conditions of intellection which birthed it or give up entirely. This is the "nothing" I was referring to, and which you correctly pointed out was not the same as an unspeakable nothing.
What problems do you see in my line of thinking? I'm still working through the Greeks so I hope I'm not just currently ignorant of some illuminating dialogue which would answer my questions.

>>23335622
But nothing qua nothing should also participate with all beings.

>>23338581
>If you say "nothing", you've already differentiated it. "Being qua Being" is already 3 things. Same with "Nothing qua Nothing". These words dont mean anything, they are all empty differentiations. The ideas they refer to are identical, just empty delimitations.

Of course the night metaphor is equivocal, because blackness still occupies space, and is thus mistaken for positive being, "something". But where everything is undifferentiated, where everything is identical, everything is nothing. Nothing can occupy space only if it is delimited, confined. Nothingness is emptiness as a "location" only when there is a difference between inside and outside this location. Without this difference, emptiness is nothing.

Why would this view be a mistake ? Things are only themselves, no more and no less. When something is identical to another, it really is, and when something is different from another, it really is either.

>>23341011
Why do you think so?

>>23340887
>the way I see it is that if we mean to speak of being meaningfully, then we are forced to speak of it using terms that define, differentiate, limit, and determine, or else we end up speaking of something so unfocused that we might as well attempt to speak of a true nothing which is unintelligible to the point of being impossible to conceive of. It's partly a reaction to Parmenides-posters I've seen on this site who get all up in arms if you speak of being in anything but the most general terms
I share your concerns. I used to have the longest back and forths with Tweetophon trying to extract how he deals with the problem. And my honest answer is that "nothing" is a strange signifier without a clear referent, but in the sense that it is intentionally a broken, mysterious, and/or mixed referent. If you've ever read Philebus 26c-d, where Socrates impressed the "seal" of a class onto the unlimited (which looks like a paradox, since it is being given a limit), you'll start to see what I mean. I'm not quite sure how we ought to treat nothing qua nothing.
>Might there not be a being-er Being which we cannot see with our frail eyes?
That only means that whatever we're seeing isn't Being. Our examples need to fit the definition, and if our examples don't meet the mark, then we need to keep looking.
>This is the "nothing" I was referring to, and which you correctly pointed out was not the same as an unspeakable nothing.
So, there's nothing qua nothing, unintelligible being, intelligible but unspeakable being, and then fully intelligible/speakable/etc. being. Any fully intelligible nothing has to be a something by definition. Some of those categories may or may not exist, I am only mapping out possibilities. The problem is I don't want "unspeakable nothing" to be confused for a something that we can't comprehend. We cannot be mixing categories.

>>23341069
>If you say "nothing", you've already differentiated it.
There's a difference between it being differentiated out in the world and our unique subjectivity of drawing our attention to it.
>"Being qua Being" is already 3 things. Same with "Nothing qua Nothing".
A three world label does not mean that the referent is three. The referents in each case are one.
>These words dont mean anything, they are all empty differentiations. The ideas they refer to are identical, just empty delimitations.
Then you would be making being and nothing the same thing, which is ridiculous if we're talking about being and nothing. Being having same essence as having no essence is a complete contradiction.
>But where everything is undifferentiated, where everything is identical, everything is nothing.
It would still be a thing, just undifferentiated. You are not grasping how radical nothingness is and you're merely stuck in the relative gradations of negation.

>>23329698
>Wtf, so Heidegger was like a German proto-Deleuze? Wow.
Sartre on steroids.

>>23341487
>Sartre anything
no.

>>23341474
>There's a difference between it being differentiated out in the world and our unique subjectivity of drawing our attention to it.

Our unique subjectivity participate in the world, and gathers the things as they are themselves. Illusion, mistake, partakes with truth. If something "is" in the world, independent of our subjectivity, it must "be" the "same way" we call anything "being". In fact, something in the world must be individuated to "be". Difference inhabits the world, and it would be presposterous to believe it to be relative to subjectivity, as if subjectivity was contingent in any way. A pure being in the world, pure presence would be identity and thus nothing. Presence and absence opposition reside in the world, it partakes in truth. In fact, pure presence (real presence opposed to phenomenal presence) would be identical to pure absence.

>A three world label does not mean that the referent is three. The referents in each case are one.

Let's count the differences. There are 6 "instances", and 3 species of instances, "Being", "qua", "Nothing". There are no more differences than these. Qua means "as itself", "in itself", alone. Qua means then pure identity, an identity which adds nothing. We are left with "Being" and "Nothing". These 2 are individuated in the fact that one is not the other, one is different from the other. But of course, when you differentiate something from another, there is a first and a second. The first is called "Nothing", the other "Being", or the other way around. What you're really doing is differentiating 2 nothings, and keeping them individuated, putting one above the other, because differentiation is always "asymmetrical" (one is not the other after all). Being and nothing dont come already individuated, any essence is already a composition of difference and identity.

>It would still be a thing, just undifferentiated. You are not grasping how radical nothingness is and you're merely stuck in the relative gradations of negation.

"It" would still "be" "a" "thing", just "undifferentiated". Undifferentiated how ? You dont choose whats undifferentiated. Saying it doesnt mean you're making sense. You can show nothing, but you're showing it with your finger. When you show nothing, your doing nothing but cutting around nothing, and say "this nothing is not this other one". It is only by cutting around nothings that we make sense of all that.

Nothingness is precisely nothing, I grasp how radical it is, but I think you dont grasp how what you call "being" isnt in any way what you think it is. The difference between nothing and nothing precedes any individuation that would make one "being" and the other "not the first one".

What do you mean gradations of negation ? My view is that there is no gradation whatsoever of being or negation. Being is univocal, anything is always univocal. Identity is true, difference is true, everything is true. Things are only themselves, no more no less etc.

>>23341474
>But where everything is undifferentiated, where everything is identical, everything is nothing.
It would still be a thing, just undifferentiated. >You are not grasping how radical nothingness is and you're merely stuck in the relative gradations of negation.

If everything is undifferentiated, it really is undifferentiated. You are saying : "but you said a "thing" !". Of course if we talk about anything we already differentiate it. I just said before that empty space would only be a thing if it was differentiated. Without this differentiation, it would be nothing. If you say that undifferentiated things are still things, you forget that I just said "undifferentiated" and you just look at the "things" before. Or else, you take "undifferentiated" to be sufficient to differenciate anything. It would amount to say "nothing" is enough to make it a "thing". When I said "you dont choose whats undifferentiated" I meant that differentiation was enough to differentiate. But we should be able to say that "undifferentiated" is enough for a thing to be nothing. Then, it would really be nothing, identical to identity.

In a way I agree with you, but i dont believe Being different from Nothing if we dont agree that differentiation is first.

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>>23342407
>Our unique subjectivity participate in the world, and gathers the things as they are themselves. Illusion, mistake, partakes with truth. If something "is" in the world, independent of our subjectivity, it must "be" the "same way" we call anything "being"
I agree that saying that calling something subjective to undermine is truth value is a copout. The point is not that what we're seeing is not how being is, but rather that we have the capacity to focus on one element at the expense of the rest. This is how predication works. If I say that the ball is large, I'm honing in on the size of the ball, allowing its other qualities (such as roughness, bounciness, color, etc.) to be subsumed into the background. The ball as a whole obviously isn't equal to largeness. In the same way, thinking and language makes us capable of chopping up wholes into parts of some kind.
>Let's count the differences. There are 6 "instances", and 3 species of instances...
It doesn't work like that. All things lead to ambiguity unless I can directly hone in on a thing. And every thing has implied, related things. With being, the implication is that everything is related to it in some way by existing. The implication of nothing is that it is the opposite of being, but it carries that additional complication of not being a thing so as to avoid mystery in its purest form. It's questionable that we've differentiated any-"thing" at all because nothing cannot participate in thinghood by definition and must be something else. Beings must compromise by conflating nothing with mystery, something which partakes in both being and nothing, because pure nothing cannot be the case.
>"It" would still "be" "a" "thing", just "undifferentiated". Undifferentiated how ?
Undifferentiated in the sense that it is a shared being of some kind, prior to any unique thing's way of being. It's not nothing because if it literally was nothing it wouldn't even be being. Undifferentiated being is not the same as nothing as that would be a category error. It's much easier to come up with an analogy for pure being as like an empty, uniform canvas, while pure nothing is so unfathomable that to say that it's just darkness is to make a qualified error that darkness is even there (and thus posit a being which spoils our nothing).
>What do you mean gradations of negation ? My view is that there is no gradation whatsoever of being or negation. Being is univocal, anything is always univocal. Identity is true, difference is true, everything is true. Things are only themselves, no more no less etc.
Negation = other than. When we say A is not, we really mean that we're referring to some other B, C, D, etc. aka how Plato's dialogue Sophist ends up reconciling what non-being is by linking it with difference (while ignoring the pure nothing).
>difference and individuation
We could explore this in more detail if you'd like.

>>23342407
>>23343641
>difference and individuation
I meant nothing and individuation. What individuates or differentiates nothing? That's a tricky question because, as far as I stand right now, nothing is not. Whenever we refer to nothing, we refer to something that is equivalent to implication, mystery, absence (of something), a blank canvas for us to project whatever we want, etc. But all these things require being to intrude into the essence of nothing (and essence of nothing already sounds ridiculous). We are trying to put "limits" around the concept which has no limits by definition, and it's even worse than things that are unlimited because it's not even a thing, it's nothing.
>>23342516
>In a way I agree with you, but i dont believe Being different from Nothing if we dont agree that differentiation is first.
This is a very good gambit. I like where you're going with this. Now I'll raise you another one, and we'll try to resolve it together.

What do we nominally disagree about? The status of nothing. But if you were to point *what* we disagree about, then you would be pointing to a non-entity. And since there is nothing to disagree about, we must be in full agreement.

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>>23344645
no you bump

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fuck, that other Deleuze thread died before I was able to bump it

last bump before I call this thread dead

I don't understand

>>23348526
It's a very niche topic, it's hard to make heads or tails of it without being deep into philosophy.

>>23329698
>Wtf, so Heidegger was like a German proto-Deleuze? Wow.
They were contemporaries, although they did not comment on each other's work.
This is just the peak of western metaphysics, kind of like how all understandings of what God is in the ancient world culminate in Jesus.

>>23348760
what deleuze should I read to know what you're talking about?
I read parmenides so I get some of the context but that's all

>>23348993
explain

parmenideez nuts

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>>23329698
>Being (ὄν) and the One (ἕν) can be said of all, and neither can be primary

But why?

>>23353451
>>23353451
Because if you do the monster math, you find that Being is, but Unity also is. You can't have Being without Unity (what makes Being a coherent whole, as even the loosest sense of Being still needs to be universal?), but then Unity would have to be above Being.

sigh

>>23329698

What a dumb reading of the Parmenides. "Being" in that dialogue is explicitly described as being in time; hence being in time, which is not-one, becomes the Dyad (and this underlies things like difference, motion, etc.). The irony of the Parmenides is that what he calls "being" is actually "not-being" - though not absolutely, since as he argues at the end such a thing would be nothing. From the One and the Dyad come the decad and then the mathematical intermediates, just like Aristotle said, except that Plato refers to the Dyad as "being" because he's a troll. And the point of the dialogue is to explain HOW absolute being interacts with the not-being that underlies difference and being in time. So Parmenides makes all these crazy arguments with contradictory conclusions - but if you understand dialectic, you see how these can all be true in different ways. Parmenides isn't raising a bunch of wacky paradoxes, it just seems that way. And he absolutely does rescue the theory of Forms - or at least makes a valiant attempt, if you follow what he's really saying.

So the Parmenides is definitely not about "being" and "one", it's about being and not-being and the theory of Forms. Plato would not have thought much of the idea that being could be difference itself - the different itself can't be anything.

>>23356008
>The irony of the Parmenides is that what he calls "being" is actually "not-being" - though not absolutely, since as he argues at the end such a thing would be nothing.
Doesn't Parmenides end with the passage that perception is and is not, that is most true? Also, what do you mean by what he calls "being" is actually "not-being"?
>From the One and the Dyad come the decad and then the mathematical intermediates, just like Aristotle said, except that Plato refers to the Dyad as "being" because he's a troll.
Does Plato refer to Dyad as "being" in Parmenides? Or does he wait to do that in Sophist?
>And he absolutely does rescue the theory of Forms - or at least makes a valiant attempt, if you follow what he's really saying.
It just sounds like whatever Theory of Forms which survives continues on in a much different appearance than before. It's more syncategorematical than indexical.
>So the Parmenides is definitely not about "being" and "one", it's about being and not-being and the theory of Forms. Plato would not have thought much of the idea that being could be difference itself - the different itself can't be anything.
I feel like you haven't grasped the problem of unity here. There's obviously the problem that unity is required for being, intellection, etc., yet unity seems to exist prior to being. So we have a feature that seems not locked to any particular domain. And if unity is required for identity, then being has to play the role of difference by being something more than just unity (e.g. it can be united, but it also has multiplicity and thus differentiation, making it difference itself).

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A shaven chicken parmenides
>behold, a philosopher!

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>>23333999
such beautiful digits

>>23356008
>>23356615
bump for reply

you... were supposed to reply. nigger

last bump unless I get a new response

>>23350696
What is there to explain?

>>23361285
>This is just the peak of western metaphysics, kind of like how all understandings of what God is in the ancient world culminate in Jesus.
um, like, a lot

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>>23361373
What does Deleuze and Heidegger have to do with Aquinas?

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>>23361377
Not much. He has a lot to do with the analogy in the latter part of my sentence you've quoted.
Duns Scotus is a little related to Deleuze; although in a vulgar way.
Anyway, read Deleuze's book on Masochism

>>23361382
thanks for wasting my time