[a / b / c / d / e / f / g / gif / h / hr / k / m / o / p / r / s / t / u / v / vg / vr / w / wg] [i / ic] [r9k / s4s / vip / qa] [cm / hm / lgbt / y] [3 / aco / adv / an / asp / bant / biz / cgl / ck / co / diy / fa / fit / gd / hc / his / int / jp / lit / mlp / mu / n / news / out / po / pol / qst / sci / soc / sp / tg / toy / trv / tv / vp / wsg / wsr / x] [Settings] [Search] [Home]
Board
Settings Home
/his/ - History & Humanities



Thread archived.
You cannot reply anymore.




How would you have used the Kriegsmarine starting in 1939? Do you think it could have been more effective? Was the surface fleet wasted?
>>
>>5944544
>How would you have used the Kriegsmarine starting in 1939
Commerce raiding.
>Do you think it could have been more effective?
No.
>Was the surface fleet wasted?
No. It did a pretty good job of not being completely useless.
>>
>>5944554

What if you manage to do a united sortie with the Bismarck, tirptitz, and the twins? Stage it as a commerce raid, but really draw out the British and try to wreck their fleet, which was already stretched thin.

And use your cruisers and pocket battleships for raiding.
>>
>>5944544
Scrap and build more tigers and re-purpose the sailors as tank crews
>>
>>5944544
Does it really matter when the war couldn't have possibly be won in any scenario?
>>
>>5944544
Disband the navy for being traitors to the state.
Germany should never be allowed to have a navy.
They were the traitors who ousted the Kaiser unlike the loyal Army.
>>
File: 1531398295251.png (542 KB, 1000x663)
542 KB
542 KB PNG
>>5944865
>>
>>5944901
That wasn't something up to Germany however.
>>
>>5944915
>They couldn't have won in any scenario!
>That scenario doesn't count!
>>
File: 1532212494864.png (59 KB, 457x500)
59 KB
59 KB PNG
>>5944915
Fail
>>
>>5944574
What a stupid fucking post
>>
>>5944923
I'm obviously talking about what Germany could've done.
>>
The Nazis built too many capital ships, and should have concentrated on submarines from the beginning of their rearmament.

Had they had 200 more ocean going submarines at the start of the war, and avoided war with the Americans, they could have greatly influenced their position. Couple that with a proper naval aviation arm and it definitely would have been better than the choice to build large surface units.
>>
>>5945104
>The Nazis built too many capital ships
The Tirpitz did more damage to the Allied War Effort than any Japanese battleship.
>>
the rules of naval engagement makes raiding tactics obselete in the age of radio

>2 ships lurking in the atlantic
>by jolly god would you stop and let us inspect your ship then we sink it once you left it, thank you gentleman
>in a moment my god sir just signaling our position to our fleet

you either sink them, without a warning or gang your ships and seek a definite engagement with the RN
>>
>>5945116
>I know of a retard that's not as retarded as another retard REEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
t. brainlet
>>
>>5945256
radios cemented the end of surface ship commerce raiding, but it had already come under pressure before radios, due to the use of propulsion.

Sailing ships could operate and be a threat for many weeks, but propulsion requires fuel and stores regularly.
>>
>>5945304

That's a good point.
>>
>>5944544
How would you compared the German surface ships with that of the IJN?
>>
>>5946539

You can't really compare them because they were built for completely different purposes. The KM was built for Atlantic raiding, North Sea brawling, to counter the French, and to dominate the Baltic.

The IJN was built for extended range and marine operations. They really were very, very different. I think, all things considered, the KM performed better relative to the resources it had. They tied up massive amounts of allied resources and almost brought the UK to its knees through raiding.

The IJN had very few successes once the US entered the war, and basically got raped at every turn.


I think you could argue that, relative to resources available, the RN performed the worst. It was the "best navy in the world" and got raped by the Japs and struggled to contain the much smaller KM.
>>
>>5946587
Not the guy you're responding to, but
>They tied up massive amounts of allied resources and almost brought the UK to its knees through raiding.
Is not really true at all. They stung the British a bit, but that's really it.

>I think you could argue that, relative to resources available, the RN performed the worst. It was the "best navy in the world" and got raped by the Japs and struggled to contain the much smaller KM.
I think that the sudden and dramatic cessation of all German maritime imports outside of the Baltic (protected by mines and coastal guns, not the KM) argues very much against this.
>>
>>5946591

But it is true. It wasn't about what they were able to sink. The RN (and USN) had to put massive resources into convoy escorts and keeping a watch on German assets. Every time the Tirpitz farted from port, the entire RN jumped.

The RN was stretched very thin.

>>5946591

It was never realistic to expect the KM to challenge the RN. It simply wasn't possible. Their role was exactly as I defined. Raiding, protection of shores, and protection of the Baltic. They did their job in an okay fashion.
>>
>>5945104
this
>>
>>5946603
Except for the part about "almost bringing the UK to its knees", which they were nowhere close to at any point in the war ad what damage they did was mostly caused by u-boats, not the surface fleet.

Furthermore, the notion that the UK was catastrophically frightened by the Tirpitz is not borne out in the low level of protection those PQ convoys got.

>heir role was exactly as I defined. Raiding, protection of shores, and protection of the Baltic. They did their job in an okay fashion.
No, they didn't. See pic related for raiding; and protection of shores and Baltic was not done by the KM, it was done primarily by the Luftwaffe and the army with their mine-laying and coastal gunning.
>>
>>5944544
How badly did the u-bots damage Britain supply lines?
>>
>>5944574
>Bismarck, tirptitz, and the twins?
problem with that plan is that neither bismarck or tirpitz were actually that devastating and the twins were fucking worthless in a fleet action, those 11 inch guns were damn nice for 11 inch guns but bollocks all use against something like a KGV or a QE, concentrate the german surface fleet and it drowns under a veritable hail of 15 and 16 inch shells with the KGVs 14s simply adding to the carnage.
>>
>>5946723
Well, British war production pretty increased every single month across almost every single category of weapon type from 1939-1943. So, not much.
>>
>>5946637

U-boats were part of the KM famalam. UK was in a dire place until 1943.

The surface fleet tied up British resources just by existing.

The surface fleet did its job to protect the shores and the Baltic, in conjunction with the Luftwaffe and coastal defenses.

If the KM was a fuckup, then what was the IJN or RN?
>>
>>5946732

British would not have survived without lend lease.
>>
>>5946733

>The surface fleet tied up British resources just by existing.
Resources which were largely non-fungible and had to spare.

>The surface fleet did its job to protect the shores and the Baltic, in conjunction with the Luftwaffe and coastal defenses.
Except for the part about not actually doing that job, and being completely unable to stop even the Home fleet should it have decided to sail right up to Kiel had it wanted to; and being totally reliant on other branches to stop them.

>If the KM was a fuckup, then what was the IJN or RN?
The IJN was also a colossal fuckup. The RN was more or less successful in its job in the Atlantic and Med, and a poor failure in the Indian Ocean and Pacific.


>>5946743
Please, prove this statement. While you're at it, try to demonstrate the incorrectness of this. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:NoZclvWisv8J:https://jmss.org/article/download/57815/43489+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b-1-ab
>>
>>5946769

As if I'm going to open your poo-Bong malware link, faggot.
>>
>>5946723
Brute Force by John Ellis gives an estimate on the percentage of imports sunk only by U-boats during the war in page 160:
1939/1940: 2%
1941: 3.9%
1942: 9.7%
1943: 2.7%
1944: 0.3%
1945: 0.6%

For sinkings from all causes, the figures are:
1939: 2.6%
1940: 3.4%
1941: 5.5%
1942: 10.6%
1943: 3%
1944: 0.4%
1945: 0.8%

In the British Statistical Digest, published shortly after the war, there is a more specific statistic of food imports lost at sea to be created from Tables 71 and 72:
1941: 6% of food imports lost
1942: 3%
1943: 2%
1944: 0.02%

Overall, Britain succeeded in getting the great majority of the cargo it needed through its ports even in the worst stages of the U-boat war.
>>
should have done a pearl harbor on sapa flow
>>
>>5946841

the anglos were too stupid to even have ships worth sinking
>>
>>5946769
Not him but Britain's dollar and gold reserves were nearly depleted by the beginning of 1941 as they had to pay for all the imports they needed from a rapidly declining export base. Without free Lend-Lease imports it's unclear how their economy could continue functioning.
>>
>>5946835
Damn, the Germans didn't even come close.
>>
>>5944574
you now have 4 more U boats
>>
>>5945104
you do know that attacking British commerce with your 200 sub fleet will eventually begin to piss off the US
>>
>>5946893
Here's an excerpt from Brute Force that illustrates well what kind of naval-industrial base the Germans were trying to undermine (p. 161):
>A comparison with the Japanese experience is particularly revealing ... Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese merchant fleet, whose survival was absolutely basic to Japan's continued ability to wage war, lost 8,616,000 tons of shipping. That was enough to cut this fleet by fully 75 percent, leaving her at the end of the war with a paltry 1.5 million tons afloat. The Allies, on the other hand, in this same period [emphasis added], lost 12,590,000 tons, almost half as much again, yet the size of their own fleet rose from 32 million tons to 54 million. The attrition effort required to make headway against margins like these was quite beyond German (and/or Japanese) capabilities.
>>
>>5946743
Yes, Lend Lease saved them.
>>
>>5946769
>Resources which were largely non-fungible and had to spare.
So I guess they got raped by the Japanese because they could spare that.
>>
>>5946889
It would not have, and they were about to have to cut a deal with Shicklegruber.
>>
>>5946956
It might, but that's what careful diplomacy is for.
>>
>>5944544
Do a better job siezing the French Navy.

Assault and capture the Straits of Gibraltar.

Hold onto the Med. for dear life, focus on owning Middle Eastern oil and removing the brits from NA before Barbarossa.

Would still probably lose.
>>
File: Pearl Harbor USS Nevada.jpg (529 KB, 1920x1440)
529 KB
529 KB JPG
>>5944574
>What if you manage to do a united sortie with the Bismarck, tirptitz, and the twins? Stage it as a commerce raid, but really draw out the British and try to wreck their fleet, which was already stretched thin.

No air cover. And remember, Bismarck got crippled by some 30 year old Sopwith Camel knock-offs and the US fleet at Pearl Harbor was destroyed a fleet of Japanese planes in less than 90 minutes in 1941.

Any attempt by the Kriegsmarine to engage the Royal Navy in open battle would've required either

A. Substantially longer-ranged Luftwaffe aircraft that could fly over much of the Atlantic (not happening under Goring).

B. Germany complete at least one of their Graf Zeppelin-class carriers and have it accompany the task force to provide CAP (Combat Air Patrol).
>>
File: Midway.jpg (309 KB, 2048x1434)
309 KB
309 KB JPG
>>5944574

Frankly the Japanese Navy in its absolute low-point of the war (post-Kure) could've beaten the shit out of the Kriegsmarine at its apex (1940-1941) by simple of the fact that they had working carriers and knew how to use them. The German naval doctrine was just that far behind.
>>
>>5946835
>>5946974
Food imports aren't the only important thing m8. UK imported a lot of things.
Now I agree with you that Germans were far from strangling British supply lines, but if for example Brits lost 20% or 30% of their X supply, that would be a major problem you know, they would have to downsize their war production, shipping costs would be through the roof, and so on...you don't need to sink 100% of their merchants to affect them badly.

And that wasn't impossible, if they focused earlier on their submarine force. So yeah, while they wouldn't be able to shutdown UK industry and starve them or something, they might've forced them to spend even more resources on ASW, slow down their military industry expansion, and so on.
>>
>>5947524
>Food imports aren't the only important thing m8
Right, the first two tables include all imports into the United Kingdom.
>>
Also, what really made German attempts in Atlantic futile was the entry of Americans into the war. America was pretty much impossible to strike in a relevant and cost-effective way. They could just use their immense industrial capacity to supply British and the rest, and that's what they did.

But if it was only UK, and if Germans actually prepared properly for sea lane interdiction (building more U-boats, naval aviation, spending more time and effort developing effective tactics and technology), a scenario where British war effort is hampered severely is quite possible. You are aware that U-boat fleet was quite small initially?
Also, a lot of their boats weren't at sea all the time, they were used to patrol North Sea, in Baltic (initially), in Adriatic and so on.

So no, I disagree that that German efforts were futile under all conditions and in all scenarios.
>>
Also, to give you an example: you need 2000 calories daily to survive. 3000 if you're doing some hard physical activity. You can get these, you're working optimally.
But what happens when you lose access to 500 calories? Or 1000 calories?

Losing 10% of their supplies isn't as negligible as you think it is.
>>
>>5944574
If the British had sense, theyd run out their Carriers and destroy this sortie. The germans didnt do it because they knew this risk was too great for them to bear
>>
>>5947580
You are aware that the historic British rationing plan gave everyone about 3,000 daily calories, right? So even losing 10% of that drops it down to "only" 2,700.
>>
>>5947602
I'm not talking about calories specifically, or food, I'm giving you an example of how things work.
What if they hypothetically lost 20% of their iron shipments?
Or oil shipments?
Or some rare metals.
While a scenario where Germans outright blockade UK is highly improbable, a scenario where German sea lane interdiction significantly disrupts British war effort is not improbable, nor was it beyond German reach.

Economic determinism isn't the answer for everything in any time period and on every scale.
>>
The Nazi destroyed multiple bong aircraft carriers, so that's certainly no magic bullet.
>>
>>5947627
Except that it's never going to work. A freighter carrying meat looks exactly the same as one carrying iron and exactly the same as one carrying gravel. Without some magic tap into all the shipping registry of all wartime freighters, you're not going to be able to selectively target goods of a specific type; the only practical way to cut back on something in particular is to hit everything at once and make up the losses across the board.

Again, the Germans historically couldn't even slow down the British wartime acceleration of the war economy to a very similar degree that the German economy accelerated; the U-boats were about as effective at that as the 1940-1942 strategic bombing campaigns, i.e. not very.

Disrupting the British war effort requires a massive increase in their successes, not a marginal one. I don't think you grasp how far away they were to doing significant damage to the British war economy.
>>
File: graph_combat_strength.gif (38 KB, 730x434)
38 KB
38 KB GIF
Another point I'm trying to make, perhaps badly, is that you don't have to destroy 100% of something to achieve success.
If Germans managed to sink 20 or 30% of British shipping in 1940/1941, that could've had major effects on the course of war.

>>5947646

I know, and I didn't mean to imply Germans could've targeted shipping like that.
>requires a massive increase in their successes
No doubt, we don't disagree on that.

What I'm arguing against is the claim that Germans had no way of impacting British supplies at any point of war...and that's just false.

The fact they actually managed to sink 10% of their shipping in 1941 is not a small feat, it's actually quite alarming, given the nature of submarines in that period, their limitations, as well as limited numbers Germans deployed.

Again, if they correctly predicted the effectiveness of submarines, if they developed better systems and techniques, and proper naval air arm, they could've severely impacted British war effort. That's my point.

They weren't close to doing it, but their campaign was a serious threat and required a lot of investment and effort to stop them.
>>
>>5947523

The navies were built completely differently you moron.
>>
>>5947679
>Again, if they correctly predicted the effectiveness of submarines, if they developed better systems and techniques, and proper naval air arm, they could've severely impacted British war effort. That's my point.
But they did predict the effectiveness of submarines, and they had quite sophisticated u-boat tactics and operations; the problem was a systemic one. At the end of the day, u-boats cannot win fights against destroyers and corvettes. The only real solution was to keep trying to find undefended or underdefended convoys, and hope you can cripple the UK before every convoy has a real defensive setup.

And a proper naval air arm is going to run into the same problem the Germans had in the Battle of Britain, namely operational range. You can only fly so far. As it was, the place where the Germans scored most of their sinkings was in the central corridor of the Atlantic ocean, a kind of no-man's land as far as land based aviation is concerned. (Until the CVE's came out, anyway) And the British are in a far more favorable position as far as bases are concerned than the Germans are, who are pretty much stuck to the coast of France and maybe French North Africa; whereas the British can stick their own planes anywhere they have a colony, which is all over the Atlantic.


>They weren't close to doing it, but their campaign was a serious threat and required a lot of investment and effort to stop them.
You can say the exact same thing about the strategic bombing campaign from the other side. It's a very mealy-mouthed, ultimately unanswerable standard to set yourself to. How do you measure success or failure by those contexts? How much effort is too much or too little? Where's the goal line?
>>
>>5947646
Not him, but I think there's a point to be made here since Dönitz historically adhered to a strategy known as "integral tonnage" where the highest goal of the U-boats was sinking as many tons of enemy shipping as possible, whether they're empty freighters near South Africa or tankers laden with fuel heading towards Britain. It should be obvious, however, which ship was more important to Britain's war effort, and now that we have the benefit of hindsight, it may have been prudent to put at least some emphasis on certain routes and the goods carried through them rather than a narrow focus on attriting the world's largest merchant fleets. This pursuit of tonnage and tonnage only led Dönitz to disperse a large number of boats to peripheral theaters like the South Atlantic, the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, etc. as opposed to the main shipping artery that was the North Atlantic. If the main goal was more specific - the targeting of certain goods that Britain was almost entirely dependent on imports for - then effects of this could make themselves felt more profoundly than trying to outsink the world's largest shipyards. With oil, for example, perhaps the most critical of them all, it's easier to both identify the cargo and where it's heading than you make it out to be. Tankers are easily recognizable, and based on some visual and circumstantial evidence you can ascertain whether or not the ship is full of oil headed to Britain or not. Empty tankers are highly buoyant, while full ones sink more below the waterline. A full one headed East towards Britain is extremely valuable cargo and if the sinkings of these ships received highest priority you could see some serious effects in the British military - not decisive, but definitely worth concern. It should be noted that U-boats did reduce the supply of a certain good - bauxite - in the United States to the detriment of military production in early 1942, although likely unwittingly.
>>
>>5947805
The natural counter-argument to that line of thinking though, is that if the U-boats start to concentrate along certain routes, the defenses are going to as well. And at the end of the day, the RN's convoy defenses have a lot more guns and durability than the u-boats.
>>
>>5947775
>But they did predict the effectiveness of submarines
Not true. Why do you think they built Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhoorst...it was debated and until war came surface fleet proponents had the upper hand.
>u-boats cannot win fights against destroyers and corvettes
Destroyers and corvettes can't be everywhere, in sufficient quantity.
>keep trying to find
To find things, they needed a developed naval air arm. And that's one of my points.
>You can say the exact same thing about the strategic bombing campaign from the other side
Strategic bombing campaign was quite disruptive though.
>>
>>5947814
And to that I would say the only way to have a targeted strategic impact on the British war effort would be to attack its main shipping lines, not some tramp steamers off the coast of Africa. They'll take losses, but it's not as if that's a foreign concept to the U-boat arm that lost over 700 boats throughout the war.
>>
>>5947805
Even if that wasn't my point, I thought of that too, and I think you're right. Both German navy and air-force suffered from the same issues, interestingly. They failed to concentrate their efforts.
>>5947814
...and then you hit them where they're weak?
Warfare is not a static phenomenon.
>>
>>5944901
I think the Soviet government could have collapsed, but Germany would be so overstretched that the Wehrmacht would be bogged down in endless guerrilla warfare, so the Western Allies could still eventually make landings in Europe. And then the first atom bombs would be used on Germany instead of Japan.
>>
>>5947838
>Why do you think they built Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhoorst...it was debated and until war came surface fleet proponents had the upper hand.
They also built about 160 u-boats by the time that Tirpitz was commissioned.

>Destroyers and corvettes can't be everywhere, in sufficient quantity.
You're missing the point; a u-boat reliant strategy is fundamentally limited to striking at targets without protective cover. It is extremely difficult to enhance the rate of effectiveness in the long term, because more and more of those convoys will be covered as the war progresses, narrowing the range of targets.

>To find things, they needed a developed naval air arm. And that's one of my points.
It's a nonsense point. WW2 technology cannot support recon planes flying from the west coast of France to somewhere off the Azores (or anywhere of similar longitude) to help out your u-boats. A heavier focus on naval aviation means it's suicidal to try to proceed up the coast of France, and that route would likely be quickly abandoned. Then what?

>Strategic bombing campaign was quite disruptive though.
Not until much later in the war, and not until the defensive barrier in the form of Luftwaffe day fighter protection had been largely broken; the equivalent in a convoy war, of destroying the convoy protection forces themselves, is not particularly feasible.

>>5947847
I obviously haven't done any real study of this counterfactual, but it seems intuitively unlikely to work. Consider, the main advantage of the U-boat force is to be able to pick fights at times and places of their choosing, and the scattered nature of an almost worldwide British trade network makes it very difficult for individual convoy protectors to react to even nearby convoys, nevermind ones halfway across the world.

By focusing attacks on specific trading lines, you're giving up the biggest advantage of the u-boat, and allowing the Royal Navy to play to their strengths of overall mass and firepower.
>>
>>5947858
And thus go right back to the non-preferred strategy of hitting more or less randomly, all over the world? If it's a large scale feint to get the UK to do what you're already doing, and not liking the results, what good is it? And you don't think the UK can react to your own reaction?
>>
>>5947906
The U-boats may not see much enemy resistance in those areas but neither will they find anything of value there either. All they'll be doing is patrolling for weeks on end looking for the occasional ship in peripheral shipping lanes, pricking away at the massive (and growing) British merchant marine. Any chance, however small, of having a strategic impact on the British war effort is wasted by this.
>>
>>5947992
Your general argument is narrow and unconvincing
>>
>>5948104
Correction: assuming you’re the uboat defender, apologies if mistaken
>>
The Nazis needed to keep the USA completely out of the war. Do that, and they win, as they could withstand anything they had to endure and their bong enemies couldn't.
>>
>>5944544
just invest in U-boat and evasion technology
followed by doing commerce runs on the British in order to starve them out
also establish a naval arm air and invest in them to a point they can wipe out capital ships
then use the surface fleets as bait for the U-boats and naval arm air
>>
>>5946587
>I think you could argue that, relative to resources available, the RN performed the worst. It was the "best navy in the world" and got raped by the Japs and struggled to contain the much smaller KM.

Bullshit

The RN may have been the largest but it was the only global navy until the Americans ramped up their own naval reach in the late war. The RN had to:

>keep the home islands supplied i.e. protect convoys
^^^ the number one priority as Britain's survival depends on this

>keep routes open to other British territories around the world
>fight the KM
>fight the Italian navy
>fight the Japanese navy
>support British and Allied military operations around the world. The British Army in particular are naturally very reliant on the RN to keep them supplied and for amphibious ops

It had to do all of this for 6 years and only failed in the Pacific, although it did return in 1944 with the formation of the British Pacific Fleet.

Note that the RN's enemies although each numerically inferior would keep their entire surface fleets in a single region. The RN could concentrate its forces but it was risky to do so, which is why the caution displayed by RN commanders was exactly the right way to play it.
>>
>>5948391

The RN even got fucked by the Italian navy.
>>
>>5948400
The fucking ITALIANS. The fucking vinoswilling ITALIANS, who didn't have enough fuel to light the wine kettles to stay drunk with.
>>
>>5948391
>fight the Japanese navy
>>
>>5948417
the only really effective italian naval action was the frogmen attack on battleships in harbour, beyond that they got fucked hard
>>
>>5948451

Do you recall the RN getting ass fucked at Malta? Of course you don't.
>>
>>5948536
Don't forget Crete... another instance of anal rape.
>>
>>5944901
Stop embarrassing yourself with this pic
>>
>>5948400
>Outnumbered by the forces of the Regia Marina, the British plan was to hold the three decisive strategic points of Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal. By holding these points, the Mediterranean Fleet held open vital supply routes. Malta was the lynch-pin of the whole system. It provided a needed stop for Allied convoys and a base from which to attack the Axis supply routes.[7]

As far as I can tell, the Italians were never able to control the Med (their backyard) by taking any of those important places. It's another case of the RN being outnumbered in a region but winning anyway.
>>
>>5948428
>Prince of Wales, Repulse
And many others.
>>
If the KM didn't build the Bismarck and Tirpitz, and builds subs instead, do people really think the UK is not going to respond appropriately? They would decrease their BBs and increase their DDS. German decisions weren't made in a vacuum.
>>
>>5944852
>Tigers
>Not Panzer III and IV
>>
>>5944923
>Could Germany win if all Soviet generals suffered a stroke and England was struck by a meteor
We're obviously discussing what Germany could have done different to win
>>
>>5944544
Shouldn't have built those Bismarck-class, too much resources in one place.
>>
>>5950274
No, the spaghetti vendors hadn't the fuel to get out of port, and still stalemated the bongs.
>>
>>5950881
Desipite losing almost all actions against the RN the Kreigsmarine *did* pay for itself in the North Atlantic, at least on a global scale.

Although losing 3/4 of its strength in the first two years of the war was a blunder what was left (most notalby Tirpitz and the remaining CA/Pocket BBs) kep a significant portion of the Royal Navy playing nursemaid to the Arctic Convoys.

The Concept of a Fleet in Being was neither new or difficult to grasp, if the Bismarck had never sortied even more RN heavies would have been stuck at Scapa not really contributing to the wider war effort. By their very presence in Norway the Kreigsmarine was restricting how the Royal Navy could operate was was almost directly responsible for the weakness of the Commonwealth Naval power in Tthe far east, Japan wouldn't have gotten nearly as far as they did if the Royal Navy had a carrier to spare for TFZ.
>>
>>5951399

Exactly. But people in this thread cannot grasp the concept of a fleet-in-being (which as you said, was nothing new).
>>
>>5944544
Scrap the entire surface fleet and enlist them in the Heer or Luftwaffe
>>
>>5951426

That's genius. A few thousand more men in the army would definitely outweigh losing Scandinavia, all shipping from Scandinavia, and having the RN free to do what it wants.
>>
>>5951399
Except that it was really a very small fraction of the Royal Navy "playing nursemaid to Arctic convoys". PQ-17, the one that got mauled to hell because of the Tirpitz scare, had 6 destroyers and a double handful of corvettes protecting it. The Heavy cover force for arctic convoys throughout the end of 1942-43 was a single battleship (Usually alternating between Duke of York and KGV, although never both at once), and a handful of escorting destroyers and usually 1 cruiser. These are not some huge disproportionate responses.
>>
>>5951399
>playing nursemaid to the Arctic Convoys.
You mean, like PQ-17?

Only a small bit of convoy traffic ever went to the Sovs, and the bong navy somehow managed to fuck this up too.
>>
>>5951442
...traffic through the North, that is.
>>
>>5951437
Not him, but honestly, if we're talking about things the Germans can do to fight the naval war better "Don't fucking attack Norway" is probably near the top of the list. That added about 2 million tons of shipping to the Royal Navy, and it's hard to make a case for anything the Germans actually got out of Norway being worth that.
>>
>>5951437
>the RN free to do what it wants.
Lord save us.
>>
>>5951450
They needed an iron ore route. The bongs should have been able to block that, but were obviously too feeble, as ever.
>>
>>5951461
>In the summer, it's shipped through the Baltic anyway
>When Swedish ports freeze, it's still along a coast that's controlled by land based aviation.

Why don't you go back to /int/ where retards like you belong?
>>
>>5951450
Securing Norway against a possible allied invasion was probaly worth it.
>>
>>5951474
It's shipped along the Norwegian coast, retard.

You really should cease posting, since you don't even understand basic geography.
>>
>>5951483
Why would the Allies invade Norway?

>>5951489
You might want to try to master basic reading comprehension anon.
>>
>>5951493
My comprehension is fine, retard.

Again recommend you consider basic geography before blathering further.
>>
>>5951493
>Why would the Allies invade Norway?

They literally did.
>>
>>5951437
I don't see how saving on 400,000 troops sitting on their hands in Norway for almost 5 fucking years is a negative
>>
>>5944544
Challenge the UK to a drag race between the Hood and Bismark, from Heligoland to Hiiumaa. Winner gets Europe.
>>
>>5951506
Germany needed Swedish iron to produce weapons. If Germany didn't control Norway the Brits might've been able to cut off Sweden from Germany
>>
>>5951504
The bongs tried to invade. It was a shambles.
>>
>>5951511
>Germany needed Swedish iron to produce weapons
They also needed to keep the Baltic sea as a "safe zone" where they could train u-boat crews.
>>
>>5951531
well but then again, Britain wouldn't have gotten through to the Baltic anyway, no way they could've got through the Denmark straits even with Norway on Britain's side
Also if Britain tried to capture Sweden, Sweden would fight with Germany, and while Sweden was no great power they weren't weak at all either
So the capture of Norway was probably pointless for Germany
>>
>>5951504
They mined a small bit of coast around Narvik. They didn't invade in the same sense that the Germans did.

>>5951500
No, it's not, or you realize how geography is integrally tied up in the statement of how coastal shipping routes were controlled by "land based aviation". Were your mother and father brother and sister?

>>5951531
Except they controlled access to the Baltic via mining the waters around Denmark, nothing to do with Norway.
>>
>>5944901
>Germany could have won if the world bent over backwards to help them win
Sure I guess a bunch of 8 year olds can defeat a professional football team if the pros go out of their way to lose.
>>
>>5951544
The Norwegian coast is a coast of Norway, retard.

You should probably stop now.
>>
>>5951544
>They didn't invade in the same sense that the Germans did.
You're right, the krauts won, while the bongs invaded and lost badly.
>>
>>5951542
Norway might not directly border the Baltic, but airfields in Norway would still make for very convenient launch pads for bombers to drop sea mines into the Baltic and the Danish straits. Mining the Baltic would make it very difficult for Germany to train u-boat crews, because that was their training area.
>>
>>5951553
Once again, you fail to even address the point. Seriously, why are you here and not on /int/ where idiots like you belong?
>>
>>5951561
How would airfields in Norway be better for the task than airfields in say, Denmark or northern Germany?
>>
>>5951570
>How would airfields in Norway be better for the task than airfields in say, Denmark or northern Germany?
Denmark was occupied by Germany for most of the war, so the UK couldn't have stationed bombers there.
>>
>>5951564
No point to address, retard.

You made a foolish assertion about Norway, blindly ignorant of the situation, geographic ignorance but a portion of that.

You really should stop.
>>
>>5951564

tbqh here senpai, you come across as an idiot
>>
>>5951438
The home fleet was comprised of 7 BB/BCs, 3 Cruisers, 27 DDs and 3 Aircraft Carriers my friend.

It's primary mission was to stop the KRM from breaking out into the Arctic/Atlantic and the 2nd Battle Squadron specifically sat in Scapa for the majoirity of the war as a counter to the KRMs northern deployments.

You can bet your ass that the RN would have wanted those units in the Med during Compass/Battleaxe/Crusader, and to further nueter the Regia Marina Heavy Units in the region.

The point still stands, the Royal Navy was the worlds only true Global Navy, with global responsibility and the KRM would have much better served themselves by not hemmoraging strength off the coast of Norway.

TL;DR, Admiral Raeder did the best he could post Norway, but after losing the majoirty of his screening elements during the Norwegian campiagn he couldn't sortie, the best he could do was keep the Home Fleet locked in Scapa, instead of being able to more freely influence other regions of the war.
>>
>>5951583
If you mean British sea-mining of the Baltic, you've got two problems with using Norway.

1) Longer ranged bombers like the 4 engined beasts could easily reach the Baltic sea from England, not needing to be based in Norway.
2) Fighters, in either case, are not likely to be able to protect them. Even somewhere like Oslo is relatively far from Baltic shipping lanes.

>>5951659
Then please explain how the assertion here >>5951474 is rebutted with "learn geography".

>>5951693
I'm actually somewhat dubious of the claim that more heavy units would be wanted for what is primarily a shipping war campaign featuring heavy use of air power in the Mediterranean shipping lanes. It's hard to see how much extra striking power a bunch of battleships would make, and not just extra targets in that case. What the British really needed were more planes, especially longer ranged ones.

But in any case, I was specifically trying to rebut the claim made here>>5951399

>kep a significant portion of the Royal Navy playing nursemaid to the Arctic Convoys.
As you point out, Home Fleet's responsibilities extended far beyond protecting arctic convoys, and it's hard to make the claim that the Home fleet was countering a fleet in being. It wasn't the Tirpitz and the handful of cruisers they were there to counter, it was the much more prevalent and deadly and actively being used threat of u-boats and other small raiders that they were out fighting.
>>
>>5951718
The Heavy units thast were in port in scapa were 100% there to counter the KRM. This wass partilly to do with the poor steaming speeds of the elderly superdreadnaughts but they would have been suited to hunting down the majority of the RM heavies, not to mention how important shore bombardment was to the defence of Tobruk in 1941, if the slow BBs could be released and adequatly protected they could have had real impact at Bardiya and El Sallom alone, not to mention how much the carriers would have helped.

YOu are right in that it was primarily the destroyers and Cruisers that would have been desirerable
>>
>>5948536
>Do you recall the RN getting ass fucked at Malta? Of course you don't.
because it didnt happen, the oly thing of note the italian navy did at malta was surrender.

>>5949661
because a stationary fleet in range of enemy surface bombers and out of range of its own air cover is going to have problems. It still fulfilled its mission
>>
>>5951958
>It still fulfilled its mission
Relinquishing the position, getting ass raped at sea and on land, and sending thousands into captivity because of incompetence?

Mission accomplished?
>>
>>5951977
covering the evacuation of crete, saving all that could be saved after the kiwi commander managed to lose the airfield and thus the battle through sheer miscommunication.

the RNs mission at crete was to withdraw as much of the british army from the island as possible, it did this in spite of heavy air attack and did this even after the british army commander urged them to abandon the remaining troops due to the intensity of the air attack.

'it takes 3 years to build a warship, it takes 300 to build a tradition, the evacuation continues'
>>
>>5952001

Lol get a load of this bong. Defending Crete like it's a victory.
>>
>>5952064
the battle was a defeat, just not for the royal navy, the defeat was for the army, the navy took nasty casualties, as it expected to given the disparity in available air cover and expected enemy air presence, and especially as the evacuation procedure required many of its ships to be stationary for prolonged period while troops were loaded. But the navy successfully accomplished its mission.

it was a success for the navy in the same way that dunkirk was a success for the navy, its still a defeat for the nation as it was a forced withdrawal of the army following that armys defeat in battle, but the RN did its job in the evacuation and did so successfully
>>
>>5952096
> the navy took nasty casualties
Yes, getting destroyed in detail and then fleeing is somewhat nasty, most would say.
>>
>>5952148
It happened to them quite often though, so apparently they've moved the goal to accommodate that.
>>
>>5952148
>>5952154

Kek
>>
>>5952096
Stop feeding the /int/ troll
>>
>>5952148
the majority of the task force survived with minor damage at most and its mission at crete was to turn up load the troops and sail back to alexandria and unload. what possible fucking reason would they have to hang around after they had loaded the troops?

the RN during the course of the battle of crete lost 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers, with bomb damage to several more, but this was not due to anything but the fact that they were facing a force of literally hundreds of bombers -280 bombers, 150 dive bombers with 180 fighters covering- and had next to no air support themselves. no navy could stay in range of that much air power for days without taking losses. especially not when engaged in operation like troop evacuation, had the roles been reversed and the italians or germans been trying to cover a evacuation against that many aircraft do you honestly believe that they would have done better? the germans who could stop a swordfish from hitting their pride and joy? the italians who couldnt stop a double handful for swordfish from sinking or crippling half their surface fleet?
>>
>>5952148
>>5952154
>>5952186
samefag
>>
>>5952242
>humiliation and failure always requires a long explanation, doesn't it?

>fortunately they've had much practice at this
>>
>>5952266
you arent actually managing to refute anything though.

largely because you cant, possibly also because you are simply a poorly educated troll with a major hate boner for anglos.

either way you dont know shit so stop talking shit and fuck right off.
>>
>buttblastedness always follows the long explanation, doesn't it?
>>
>>5947523
>The German naval doctrine was just that far behind
There's maybe just a tiny possibility its not that the doctrine was outdated, but they needed all the resources that go into building a ton of big boats for something else (like a maybe a possible invasion of the Soviet Union but this is just speculation I mean who knows right) and there's the slightest chance that the production of that something else would be more beneficial for Germany than building ships it doesn't need in order to fight the royal navy toe to toe when it doesn't really have to.
>>
>>5953101
Not him, but you're presenting it as an either/or thing when it was really kind of both. The Germans didn't have the resources necessary to compete on even footing on the water with Britain AND they had pretty poor ship design (consider how the Bismarck was more or less evenly gunned and armed with a KGV class vessel despite displacing about 15,000 more tons) AND had bad naval doctrine; like not coordinating their u-boats and surface raiders in anything but the most cursory of fashions.
>>
Remind me, what went wrong with the previous HGWs?
From what I remember;
>1st
Only Saber, Lancer and Archer, thus not enough servants to manifest the Grail
>2nd
Literally everyone died, too much collateral damage, church chosen to mediate in the future
>3rd
Einzbern fucked it up for everyone by summoning Avenger instead of Berserker thus tainting the grail, but why did no one win?
>>
>>5953132
Beg pardon?
>>
>>5952242
He's thinking in video game terms.
The RN lost because they didn't kill all of the enemy and didn't capture the point.
It's why he can't wrap his head around the fact that they set out to accomplish 'X' at Crete and they did.
>>
>video games... they might establish mission accomplished for us... let's go that route
>>
>>5953193
No, he's just the Bongposter, an /int/ troll set out to indulge his bizarre hatred of British people.
>>
>>5953132
wtf
>>
>do we have to be bootyblasted over our video game annihilations though?
>>
>>5953132
based schizophrenic poster
>>
>>5944554
Commerce raiding with a battleship is like swatting flies with a sledgehammer.



Delete Post: [File Only] Style:
[Disable Mobile View / Use Desktop Site]

[Enable Mobile View / Use Mobile Site]

All trademarks and copyrights on this page are owned by their respective parties. Images uploaded are the responsibility of the Poster. Comments are owned by the Poster.